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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARC WILLIAM SCHUMACHER, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 015501427 
Judge: J. Philip Eves 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's AMENDED MOTION FOR A HEARING TO 
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE/REASONABLE SUSPICION AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
INJUNCTION (in reality a Motion to Suppress), filed September 6, 2001. The State filed an 
Objection thereto on October 10, 2001. A hearing on the matter was held on October 29, 2001, 
at which time both sides presented evidence and oral argument to the Court. The Court took the 
matter under submission to allow the parties to present copies of cases upon which they relied, 
which the Defendant did. 
Having heard the parties' arguments, having considered the parties' memoranda and 
cases, having researched the relevant law, and now being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
rules as follows. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
This case arises out of a traffic stop in Cedar City, Utah. Defendant Marc William 
-2-
Schumacher ("Defendant"), who is representing himself in this case, argues that any evidence 
gathered as a result of the vehicle stop which took place on May 26, 2001 must be suppressed, 
because the stop was illegal. 
The evidence demonstrates that at around 9:00 p.m. on May 26, 2001, the police 
dispatcher in Cedar City, Utah, put out a call for officers to investigate a suspicious vehicle, an 
older green pickup truck that had been parked in the parking lot at the Cinema 8 Theaters in 
Cedar City since around 3:00 p.m. that day. Agent Brent Dunlap of the Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation was just exiting Interstate 15, about Vi mile away from the Cinema 8 Theaters, 
heard the broadcast and responded. 
As Agent Dunlap arrived at the Cinema 8 parking lot, he observed an older green pickup 
truck parked with its hood up. Before he could reach the Defendant's vehicle, Agent Dunlap 
saw Defendant shut the hood of the pickup truck, get in, and drive off, exiting the parking lot 
northbound onto Sage Drive. Agent Dunlap testified that he followed Defendant, who appeared 
to be traveling fairly quickly, onto Sage Drive. Agent Dunlap was unable to "get a speed" for 
Defendant. Agent Dunlap testified that as he followed Defendant on Sage Drive, and at the 
intersection with 600 South, the Defendant turned right onto 600 South (eastbound) without 
making a full stop at the stop sign at that intersection. 
Officer Mike Russell of the Cedar City Police Department was also responding to the 
suspicious vehicle broadcast at about the same time. He was approaching westbound on 600 
South, moving in the direction of Defendant, the Cinema 8 Theaters and Agent Dunlap. Officer 
Russell testified that Agent Dunlap advised him by radio that the Defendant had not stopped at 
the stop sign. Around 500 West and 600 South, Officer Russell encountered the Defendant's 
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vehicle eastbound with Agent Dunlap behind it. Officer Russell made a U-turn, got behind 
Defendant, and activated his overhead lights. The Defendant pulled to the curb, Officer Russell 
stopped right behind him and Agent Dunlap parked his vehicle behind Officer Russell's within a 
few seconds. 
Once at Defendant's vehicle, Officer Russell detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant's 
breath, and noticed empty beer cans in plain view in the cab of Defendant's truck. Officer 
Russell then performed a series of "field sobriety tests," on which Defendant did not perform 
well. Officer Russell then informed Defendant that he was going to transport Defendant to the 
Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for an Intoxilyzer 5000 test. 
Officer Russell impounded Defendant's vehicle after the arrest, at which time he found a 
partially empty can of beer in the cab of the truck, and at least three (3) empty cans of beer in the 
bed of the truck. At the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility, Defendant refused to 
participate in the Intoxilyzer 5000 test. Defendant was eventually cited for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, and for Open Container in Vehicle. 
ISSUE 
Defendant has moved to suppress any and all evidence gathered as a result of the stop, on 
the grounds that the stop was illegal because the officer who stopped him, Officer Russell, did 
not have a reasonable suspicion for that stop, as he had not observed Defendant run the stop sign 
at the intersection of Sage Drive and 600 South. 
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The State argues that Officer Russell had sufficient reasonable suspicion for the stop 
because he had been informed by Agent Dunlap of the offense, and that Agent Dunlap, having 
witnessed the offense, had sufficient reasonable suspicion. 
ANALYSIS 
IF THE REPORTING OFFICER/AGENCY HAS SUFFICIENT REASONABLE 
SUSPICION FOR A STOP, A STOP BASED ON THEIR REQUEST IS LEGAL 
Because Agent Dunlap had sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop, based on the fact 
that he witnessed Defendant commit an offense (running the stop sign), and he communicated 
that lawful basis for a vehicle stop to Officer Russell, the resulting stop by Officer Russell was 
lawful. 
A similar situation was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). In that case, University of Utah Police stopped a vehicle based on a 
radio broadcast that they received from dispatch of a suspicious vehicle, and a possible car 
burglary. During the course of the stop, the officer detected the odor of alcohol, and ultimately 
the driver was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The defendant there also 
sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop was illegal because the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop. 
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and suppressed the seized 
evidence for the reason that the broadcast was not based on information in possession of the 
dispatcher, or anyone else in the law enforcement agency, that created a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the stop. The Case facts differ from the present matter in that in Case, dispatcher did 
not have sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop when the radio transmission was made, 
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whereas, in the present matter Agent Dunlap did have sufficient reasonable suspicion, by virtue 
of having witnessed Defendant run the stop sign, when he made his transmission to Officer 
Russell. 
The law is clear that the stopping of a motor vehicle invokes protections of Constitutional 
magnitude. As the Case Court stated: 
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within 
the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Accord State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 982 
(Utah App. 1992). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (defining Fourth 
Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away"). Case, 884 P.2d atl276. 
The requirements for a Terry investigatory stop are codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-7-15 (1990), which authorizes law enforcement personnel to "stop any person in a 
public place when [the officer] has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions." IcL, fn 2. 
Thus, the law is clear that an officer may make a stop of a person or a vehicle when an 
offense is committed in his presence. The question raised by the Defendant in the present case is 
whether the officer actually making the stop is allowed to rely on information provided by 
another officer who has reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Defendant argues that because 
Officer Russell did not witness the stop sign offense, he lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
make the stop. 
The Court in Case defined a narrow range of circumstances where an officer may rely on 
information from others to provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop. 
An investigative stop may survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively 
relies on information, bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement 
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sources. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S. Ct. 675, 682, 83 L. 
Ed. 2d 604 (1985). Accord State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Seel 827 P.2d 954, 960 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The Hensley decision is a landmark case which added an important clarification to 
the Terry investigatory stop doctrine. In Hensley, officers from the Covington, 
Kentucky, police department stopped the defendant based on a "wanted flyer,"< 
received via teletype from the St. Bernard, Ohio, police department, describing 
the defendant's alleged involvement in an armed robbery. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 
223. The Supreme Court first ruled that a Terry stop is not limited to 
investigation of ongoing or future crimes. n3 Id. at 228-29. The Court then held 
that an investigating officer may rely on a flyer or bulletin from other Police 
Departments to justify an investigative stop, but only "if the police who issued the 
flyer or bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop." Id. at 232, 
* * * 
In allowing such reliance, the Court made a logical progression from its decision 
fourteen years earlier in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), in which it 
determined the legality of an arrest based on radioed arrest warrant information. 
The Whiteley Court held that an officer can make a valid arrest based on such 
broadcast information only if the department issuing the information had 
sufficient probable cause to support the arrest warrant. Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568. 
By applying the Whiteley approach to reasonable suspicion scenarios, the Hensley 
Court concluded that the officer or department who issues a directive for 
investigation to other police must have sufficient reasonable suspicion, through 
specific and articulable facts, to support the stop. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. 
Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the distinction between Case and the present matter is the existence, or lack 
thereof, of reasonable suspicion in the possession of the officer or police agency who issues the 
directive for the stop. If that officer/agency has sufficient reasonable suspicion to initiate the 
stop, then a directive from that officer/agency may be relied upon by an officer who does not 
personally possess reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of a vehicle or person. 
In the present matter, when Officer Russell stopped Defendant based on the radio 
transmission by Agent Dunlap, who clearly possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop 
Defendant after personally witnessing Defendant commit an offense by running the stop sign, he 
did not perform an illegal seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Agent Dunlap had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant, and 
communicated that information to Officer Russell, Officer Russell's subsequent stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle was proper. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. This matter 
should now be set for trial. 
DATED this P*f may of November 2001. 
J^U-C^-
J./HILIP EVES DWtrict Court Judge 
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